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CPLR 204(b).: Toll will not be granted where
colorable basis for arbitrationis lacking.
CPLR 204(b) tolls the statute of limitations for the period
between a demand for arbitration and a final determination that
there is no obligation to arbitrate. Section (b) is not explicitly
qualified to apply only to well-founded, controvertible, demands
for arbitration, but reason dictates that there be some such qualified use of the provision.
In Watkins v. Holiday Drive-Ur-Self, Inc.,' the court, since it
found that there was no basis for believing that arbitration was
available, refused to toll the statute of limitations. The plaintiff's
actions, in demanding arbitration, are probably explained by a
mistaken belief that the defendant's insurance carrier was a signatory to an agreement providing for arbitration.
The bar should thus note that a demand for arbitration must
be made with care for if it is legally an empty request, made
either through mistake or as a tactic to increase one's time to
deal with a case, it will have no effect on the running of the
statute of limitations. Thus, an attorney who allows the statute
to expire during such a course of action may be subject to the
danger of a malpractice suit.
CPLR 214: "Continuing practice" theory applied
in attorney malpractice cases.
Generally, in a malpractice case, the statute of limitations
runs from the time that the malpractice occurs

2

rather than from

the time when it is discovered. However, various exceptions to
the general rule have evolved.3
For example, in the medical
field, the "continuing practice" theory has received Court of Appeals' endorsement. 4 According to this theory, if treatment continues after the actual malpractice, the statute runs from the
date of the last treatment. The rationale is that, where treatment occurs on more than an occasional -visit and extends over a
period of time, the relationship between patient and doctor must
129 App. Div. 2d 810, 287 N.Y.S.2d 730 (3d Dep't 1968).

2Conklin v. Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y.S. 529 (lst Dep't),
aff'd weithout opinion, 254 N.Y. 620, 173 N.E. 892 (1930); see 1 WEINsTIN,
KoRN & MILER, NEw YORK Civm PRAarcr 1214.18 (1966) for a discussion 3of the problems raised when there are unknown injuries.
See McLaughlin, Annual Survey of New York Law: Civil Practice,
14 SYRAcusE:
L. REv. 347, 353-54 (1962).
4
Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237
N.Y.S.2d 319 (1962).

